Unassailable Sensor Networks

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Secure sensor networks
Random pre-distribution of keys
Random pre-distribution of keys
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Random pre-distribution of keys
Random pre-distribution of keys
Aims of this talk

• To convince Jean-Pierre that there is still a lot of interesting work to do in this framework

• Give a warning: Model is not only not completely understood, it is in fact misunderstood
Kryptographs

There are $N$ nodes (or vertices):

• Each vertex $u$ is given a key ring of size $k$, sampled at random from a pool of size $K$

• Two vertices $u$ and $v$ are neighbours iff they share a key

The resulting graph is called a kryptograph $G(N,k,K)$
Geometric Kryptographs

- N nodes (vertices) are distributed at random within the unit square
- Each vertex \( u \) is given a key ring of size \( k \), sampled at random from a pool of size \( K \)
- Two vertices \( u \) and \( v \) are neighbours iff they share a key and are within transmission range \( r \)

The resulting graph is called a (geometric) kryptograph \( G(N,r,k,K) \)
Random pre-distribution of keys

We can set up a WSN that it is connected via encryption-protected links
Random pre-distribution of keys

We can set up a WSN that it is connected via encryption-protected links.

Yellow link: two sensors are in the same communication range, but they do not share a key.

Red link: two sensors are in the same communication range, and they do share at least a key.
Random pre-distribution of keys

Originally introduced for sensor networks this elegant idea is general enough to apply to other scenarios, e.g. peer-to-peer networks

As discussed during this course, there are many interesting developing or new scenarios.

Keep your eyes open!
Our Goal

Given N (number of nodes) and r (transmission range), fix key-ring size k and pool-size K in such a way that the network is at the same time

1. Connected
2. Secure against massive attacks

We need to define precisely what we mean by "security". We'll do so in a minute
Conflicting goals

Note that connectivity and security are at odds:

1. Connectivity wants the key ring to be large, since this increases the probability of having links
2. Security likes them to be small, since in this fashion capturing a key is unlikely to corrupt many links

We will show that $k$ and $K$ can be fixed to have BOTH. To the best of our knowledge this approach is entirely new
Misunderstandings
Erdös-Renyi

$N = \#\text{vertices}$ \quad $p = \text{edge probability}$
Erdős-Renyi

\[ N = \#\text{vertices} \quad p = \frac{(\text{key ring})^2}{(\text{pool size})} \]
Erdös-Renyi

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Erdős-Renyi

\[ N = \#\text{vertices} \quad p = \frac{(\text{key ring})^2}{(\text{pool size})} \]
Erdős-Rényi

Crucially, edges exist independently of each other.
Triangles
Triangles
Triangles
Triangles

Now ★ must be either ★ or ★: Pr(edge exists) > 1/2
Triangles

Kryptograph: \( \text{Pr(edge exists)} > \frac{1}{2} \)

Erdös-Renyi random graph: \( \text{Pr(edge exists)} = \frac{2}{(\text{pool size})} = 0.00 \ldots 001 \)
Structural differences
Methodological remarks

1. No need to approximate with Erdös-Renyi model, cryptographs can be analyzed exactly.

2. Precise understanding is always important, but especially so when SECURITY is at stake.

3. Indeed, note that “triangle” dependency above is BAD for security: if adversary owns key ring it is more likely than with Erdös-Renyi to corrupt links between neighbours of captured node.

4. Also note: unclear how to formally define security properties in Erdös-Renyi framework. Indeed, security approached only experimentally in the literature.
Our notion of security

Suppose that by capturing a tiny fraction of the nodes (e.g. √n nodes) we can compromise a linear fraction of the links. We would consider the network highly insecure.

Conversely, we would consider it secure if, in order to compromise a large fraction of the links, a large fraction of the nodes must be captured.
Security against Massive Attacks
Security against Massive Attacks
Security against Massive Attacks
Security against Massive Attacks
Security against Massive Attacks
Redoubtable Networks

We consider massive attacks. The RANDOM ADVERSARY selects nodes at random:

✓ if a node is selected its entire key ring is owned by the adversary

✓ if uv is a link and the adversary owns a key in $K(u) \cap K(v)$ the link is compromised (note this is a pessimistic assumption since the key might not be used)

The aim of the adversary is to compromise linearly many links. We say that the network is REDOUBTABLE if to do so the adversary must select linearly many nodes
Our Goal (revisited)

Given $N$ and $r$, fix $k$ and $K$ in such a way that the network is at the same time, with high probability:

1. Connected
2. Redoubtable
Main Theorem

If

\[(\text{key ring size})^2/(\text{pool size}) \sim \log(N)/N\]

Then, with high probability, the network is both connected and redoubtable.

High probability means that the probability that anything goes wrong goes (very quickly) to zero as N grows. For instance, assume \(N = 256\), \(K = 16,384\), and \(k = 128\), then \(p \approx 2^{-23}\).

Remark: if \(k^2/K \ll \log(N)/N\) network is disconnected with good (constant) probability.
Unassailable Networks

The OMNISCENT ADVERSARY:

✓ It knows the entire distribution of keys, i.e. it knows the sets $K(u)$, for every vertex $u$
✓ As before, if a node is selected its entire key ring is owned by the adversary and a link uv is compromised as soon as it owns a key in $K(u) \cap K(v)$
✓ Its aim of the adversary is to compromise linearly many links.

We say that the network is UNASSAILABLE if to do so the omniscient adversary must select linearly many nodes.
The omniscient adversary knows how the keys are distributed. How many nodes does it have to capture to compromise a linear fraction of the links?
Our Goal

Given N and r, fix k and K in such a way that the network is at the same time, with high probability

1. Connected
2. Unassailable
Omniscent Adversary

Unrealistically strong?
Omniscent Adversary

Unrealistically strong? Yes, but this is entirely desirable!

- Certifying security against it, automatically subsumes weaker, more realistic attackers (e.g. random attackers)
- It shows light weight, insecure key-discovery protocols are not unsafe (against the kind of attack we are considering)
Main Theorem

If

\[(\text{key ring size})^2 / (\text{pool size}) \sim \log(N) / N\]

Then, with high probability, the network is both connected and unassailable.
Main Theorem

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Remark: if \(k^2/K \ll \log(N)/N\) network is disconnected with good (constant) probability.
Unsplittable Networks

Suppose now that the adversary wants to split the network into two large chunks, compromising all links between them (i.e. it wants to partition the network). Can it do it by capturing a small set of nodes?
2nd Main Theorem

If

\[(\text{key ring size})^2/\text{(pool size)} \sim \log(N)/N\]

Then, with high probability, the network is both connected and unsplittable (and also unassailable)
If

\[(\text{key ring size})^2/\text{(pool size)} \sim 1/N\]

Then, with high probability, the network has a GIANT COMPONENT that is at the same time unsplittable and unassailable.
3rd Main Theorem

If

$$(\text{key ring size})^2 / (\text{pool size}) \sim 1/N$$

Then, with high probability, the network has a GIANT COMPONENT that is at the same time unsplittable and unassailable.

Small key ring size gives several benefits in resource starving environments.

A giant component is sparse (degree is constant instead of $\log(N)$). And yet it has very strong connectivity properties: It is an EXPANDER.
We also know that the kryptograph and the giant component are EXPANDERS.
To summarize

Kryptographs have very strong connectivity, security and fault-tolerant properties:

- If $k^2/K \sim \log(N)/N$ they are, with high probability, connected, unsplittable and unassailable. Furthermore they are expanders.

- If $k^2/K \sim 1/N$ they have, with high probability, a giant component that is unsplittable, unassailable and (we bet..) is an expander.
Analysis:

Framing the omniscient adversary
FACT 1: if the adversary picks $t$ bins, the maximum damage is given by the $t$ largest bins
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FACT 2: if $K \geq N^2$ then, with high probability, no bin has more than 5 balls i.e. no key can compromise more than 10 edges
Useful bins
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FACT 2: if \( K \geq N^2 \) then, with high probability, no bins has more than 5 balls i.e. no key can compromise more than 10 edges

FACT 3: With high probability, no vertex has more than \( \log(N) \) useful bins
FACT 1: if the adversary picks t bins, the maximum damage is given by the t largest bins

FACT 2: if $K \geq N^2$ then, with high probability, no bins has more than 5 balls i.e. no key can compromise more than 10 edges

FACT 3: With high probability, no vertex has more than $\log(N)$ useful bins

FACT 4: WHP, the graph has $N \log(N)$ edges
Proof

- The adversary must compromise $\Theta(N \log(N))$ edges.
- It needs $\Theta(N \log(N))$ useful bins, since each bin can yield at most 10 edges.
- Each node can contribute at most $\log(N)$ useful bins.
- Hence it must capture $\Theta(N)$ nodes.

\[QED\]
Tools

- Doing the analysis requires large deviation inequalities.

- Assuming $K \geq N^2$ simplifies the analysis considerably. Chernoff-Hoeffding is enough.

- Assuming $K \geq N \log(N)$ requires a more interesting proof, and more sophisticated Martingale arguments.
Experiments

Analytical results confirmed in full
Connectivity

Randomly generated secure sensor network of size 200. Communication range is 0.2, key ring size is 4, and pool size is 50. Lighter lines mean physical visibility, darker lines secure visibility. This graph is connected by using secure links alone.
Randomly generated secure sensor network of size 200. Communication range is 0.2, key ring size is 4, and pool size is 100. Lighter lines mean physical visibility, darker lines secure visibility. The network has a few isolated sensors.
Randomly generated secure sensor network of size 200. Communication range is 0.2, key ring size is 4, and pool size is 150. Lighter lines mean physical visibility, darker lines secure visibility. The network has a slightly larger number of isolated sensors and even some very small disconnected components.
Number of sensors that the attacker has to collect to compromise 50% and 25% of the network links.

Observe linear growth, as predicted by theory.
Open Problems

Considering security and connectivity properties simultaneously is very fruitful. Future work might consider:

• Different attacks (we want proper definitions for rigorous proofs)
• Other desirable connectivity properties
• Peer-to-peer
• Mobility
• The existence of special, stronger nodes in the network
• Density estimates for good properties to hold
THANKS!