#### BitBlaze: a New Approach for Computer Security via Binary Analysis

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#### Malicious Code---Critical Threat on the Internet

- Diverse forms
  - Worms, botnets, spyware, viruses, trojan horses, etc.

#### High prevelance

- CodeRed Infected 500,000 servers
- 61% U.S. computers infected with spyware [National Cyber Security Alliance06]
- Millions of computers in botnets
- Fast propagation
  - Slammer scanned 90% Internet within 10 mins
- Huge damage
  - \$10billion annual financial loss [ComputerEconomics05]

## Defense is Challenging

- Software inevitably has bugs/security vulnerabilities
  - Intrinsic complexity
  - Time-to-market pressure
  - Legacy code
  - Long time to produce/deploy patches
- Attackers have real financial incentives to exploit them
  - Thriving underground market
- Large scale zombie platform for malicious activities
- Attacks increase in sophistication
- We need more effective techniques and tools for defense
  - Previous approaches largely symptom & heuristics based

## The BitBlaze Approach

• Semantics based, focus on root cause:

Automatically extracting security-related properties from binary code (vulnerable programs & malicious code) for effective defense

- Automatically create high-quality detection & defense mechanisms
  - Automatic generation of vulnerability signatures to filter out exploits
  - Automatic detection and classification of malware
    - » Spyware, keylogger, rootkit, etc.
  - Automatic detection of botnet traffic
- Able to handle binary-only setting
  - Important for COTS & malicious code scenarios
  - Binary is truthful

## The BitBlaze Research Foci

- 1. Design and develop a unified binary analysis platform for security applications
  - Identify & cater common needs of different security applications
  - Leverage recent advances in program analysis, formal methods, binary instrumentation/analysis techniques to enable new capabilities
- 2. Introduce binary-centric approach as a powerful arsenal to solve real-world security problems
  - COTS vulnerability discovery, diagnosis & defense
  - Malicious code analysis & defense
  - Automatic model extraction & analysis
  - More than a dozen security applications & publications

#### BitBlaze Binary Analysis Infrastructure: Architecture

- The first infrastructure:
  - Novel fusion of static, dynamic analysis techniques, and formal analysis techniques such as symbolic execution & abstract interpretation
  - Capable of analyzing whole system (including OS kernel)
  - Capable of analyzing packed/encrypted/obfuscated code



**BitBlaze Binary Analysis Platform** 

## Outline

#### • BitBlaze in action: sample security applications

- Automatic patch-based exploit generation
- Automatic Signature Generation
- In-depth malware analysis

#### BitBlaze Binary Analysis Infrastructure

- Challenges
- Design rationale
- Architecture

#### Patch Tuesday

- On the surface: security patches fix vulnerabilities
- Beneath the surface:
  - What's the security consequence of a patch release?
- Our work:
  - Current patch approach is dangerous
  - Automatic exploit generation



#### Automatic Patch-based Exploit Generation

- Given vulnerable program P, patched program P', automatically generate exploits for P
- Why care?
  - Exploits worth money
    - » Typically \$10,000 \$100,000
    - » Great source of research funding :-)
  - Know thy enemy
    - » Security of patch distribution schemes?
    - » Can a patch make you more vulnerable?

Patch testing

## **Running Example**



- All integers unsigned 32-bits
- All arithmetic mod 2<sup>32</sup>
- Motivated by real-world vulnerability



## Running Example



## **Running Example**





## Input Validation Vulnerability

- Programmer fails to sanitize inputs
- Large class of security-critical vulnerabilities
  - "Buffer overflow", "integer overflow", "format string vulns", etc.
- Responsible for many, many compromised computers





#### Exploits for P are inputs that fail vulnerability condition at vulnerability point (s > input) = false

#### Our Approach for Patch-based Exploit Generation (I)

#### **Exploit Generation**

- 1. Diff P and P' to identify candidate vuln point and condition
- 2. Create input that satisfy candidate vuln condition in P'
  - i.e., candidate exploits
- 3. Check candidate exploits on P



#### Our Approach for Patch-based Exploit Generation (II)

#### • Diff P and P' to identify candidate vuln point and condition

- Currently only consider inserted sanity checks
- Use binary diffing tools to identify inserted checks
  - » Existing off-the-shelf syntactic diffing tools
  - » BinHunt: our semantic diffing tool
- Create candidate exploits
  - i.e., input that satisfy candidate vuln condition in P'
- Validate candidate exploits on P
  - E.g., dynamic taint analysis (TaintCheck)

## **Create Candidate Exploits**

- Given candidate vulnerability point & condition
- Compute Weakest Precondition over program paths
  - Using vulnerability condition as post condition
  - Construct formulas representing conditions on input
    - » Whose execution path included
    - » Satisfying the vulnerability condition at vulnerability point
- Solve formula using solvers
  - E.g., decision procedures
  - Satisfying answers are candidate exploits

#### **Different Approaches for Creating Formulas**

#### Statically computing formula

- Covering many paths (without explicitly enumerating them)
- Sometimes hard to solve formula
- Dynamically computing formula
  - Formula easier to solve
  - Covering only one path
- Combined dynamic and static approach
  - Covering multiple paths
  - Tune for formula complexity
- Experimental results
  - Different approach effective for different scenarios
- Other techniques to make formulas smaller and easier to solve

## **Experimental Results**

- 5 Microsoft patches
  - Mostly 2007
  - Integer overflow, buffer overflow, information disclosure, DoS
- Automatically generated exploits for all 5 patches
  - In seconds to minutes
  - 3 out of 5 have no publicly available exploits
  - Automatically generated exploit variants for the other 2
- Diffing time
  - A few minutes

## **Exploit Generation Results**

Time (s)	DSA_SetItem	ASPNet _Filter	GDI	IGMP	PNG
Dynamic Total	5.68	11.57	10.34	N/A	N/A
Formula	5.51	4.64	10.33	N/A	N/A
Solver	0.17	6.93	0.01	N/A	N/A
Static Total	83.47	N/A	26.41	N/A	N/A
Formula	2.32	N/A	4.99	N/A	N/A
Solver	81.15	N/A	21.42	N/A	N/A
Combined	11.51	N/A	29.07	13.57	104.28
Forumla	6.72	N/A	25.29	13.31	104.14
Solver	4.79	N/A	3.78	0.26	0.14

#### When could technique fail?

Decision procedure cannot solve C

 Exploit depends on several conditions in P' (works in some cases)

– etc.

#### However, security design must conservatively estimate attackers capabilities

## We generate exploits in seconds to minutes Fast worms: ~10 minutes to infect all hosts [2003]

#### Patch release can create serious threats

![](_page_23_Figure_2.jpeg)

#### **Other Security Applications**

- Effective new approaches for diverse security problems
  - Over dozen projects
  - Over 12 publications in security conferences
- Exploit detection, diagnosis, defense

![](_page_24_Figure_5.jpeg)

- In-depth malware analysis
- Others:
  - Reverse engineering
  - Deviation detection [Best Paper Award]
  - Semantic binary diff

#### Popular Defense: Input-based Filtering---Block out Exploits

![](_page_25_Figure_1.jpeg)

- Input-based filtering
  - Signature f: given input x, f(x) = exploit or benign
  - Effective, widely-deployed defense
- Central question:

How to generate signatures, esp. for new attacks?

## Signature Generation

- Current common practice: Manual signature generation
  - Slow, esp. for zero-day attacks
  - Labor-intensive
  - Inaccurate
  - Limited for scalability & complexity
- Our work: automatic generation of vulnerability signatures

![](_page_26_Picture_7.jpeg)

## **Previous Approaches Insufficient**

#### Previous approaches: pattern-extraction based

- Extract common patterns in worm samples, not in benign samples
  - » Common substring or combination thereof
  - » Honeycomb[Kreibich-Hotnets03]
  - » Earlybird[Singh-OSDI03]
  - » Autograph[Kim-USENIX05]
  - » Polygraph[Song-IEEE S&P05]

# Signature

#### Disadvantages

- Insufficient for polymorphic worms
  - » Can't generate signatures for unseen variants
- No guarantee of signature quality
- Susceptible to adversarial learning [Song-RAID06]
- Purely bit-pattern syntactic approach, so no semantic understanding of vulnerability

#### Automatic Generation of Vulnerability Signatures

- Instead of bit patterns, use root cause
  - Generating signatures based on vulnerability
- Given an exploit, first identify vulnerability information
  - Vulnerability Point: where the vulnerability is
  - Vulnerability Condition: what triggers the vulnerability
    - » E.g., condition for buffer overflow
  - Using a combination of static & dynamic analysis
- Then generate signatures with given vulnerability information

![](_page_28_Figure_9.jpeg)

Approach: Extracting Constraints Imposed by Vulnerability

- As exploits morph, they need to trigger vulnerability
- So, vulnerability puts constraints on exploits
- Problem reduction:
  - Signature generation =
    constraints on inputs that trigger vulnerability
- Symbolic execution
- Soundness guaranteed (no false positives)

#### Automatic Vulnerability Signature Generation

What should the signature be?

![](_page_30_Figure_2.jpeg)

## **Protocol-aware Signatures**

- So far, symbolic constraint signatures operate on bits
- Given protocol parsing information (e.g., a parse tree),
  - lift constraints to field-level
  - Remove parsing related constraints
  - Generate symbolic constraint signatures on field-level
- Effective for variable-length fields, iterative fields, etc.
- Used in conjunction with signature matching engine with protocol parsing capability

#### **Evaluation: Protocol-aware Signatures**

 Automatically generated optimal or close to optimal signatures for real-world exploits

- SQL, GHttpd, AtpHttpd, GDI, Windows DCOM RPC vulnerabilities

#### • Signature for SQL:

- (FIELD\_CMD==4) ^ length(FIELD\_DB) > 64

#### • Signature for GHttpd:

- (strcmp(METHOD, "GET") != 0 ^ length(METHOD) > 165) || (strcmp(METHOD, "GET) == 0 ^ strstr(URI, "/..") !=0 ^ length(URI)>170) || (strcmp(METHOD, "GET") == 0 ^ strstr(URI, "/..") == 0 ^ length(URI) + length(ClientAddr) > 166)

## In-depth Malware Analysis

- High volume of new malware needs automatic malware analysis
- Given a piece of suspicious code sample,
  - What malicious behaviors will it have?
  - How to classify it?
    - » Key logger, BHO Spyware, Backdoor, Rootkit
  - What mechanisms does it use?
    - » How does it steal information?
    - » How does it hook?
  - Who does it communicate with? Where does it send information to?
  - Does its communication exhibit certain patterns?
  - Does it contain trigger-based behavior?
    - » Time bombs
    - » Botnet commands
- Can we design & develop a unified framework to answer these questions?

#### BitScope: THE In-depth Malware Analysis infrastructure

- Identify/analyze malicious behavior based on root cause
  - Privacy-breaching malware: spyware, keylogger, backdoor, etc.
  - Malware perturbing system by hooking: rootkit, etc.
- Understand how malware get into the system
  - What mechanisms/vulnerabilities does it exploit
- Explore hidden behavior, detect trigger-based behavior
  - Automatically identifying botnet program commands, time bombs

![](_page_34_Figure_8.jpeg)

## BitBlaze Malware Analysis Online

- A subset of our malware analysis functionalities
  - Malware unpacking, IDA-Pro plug-in
  - Extracting behaviors
- Parallel architecture for high-volume malware analysis
- Public service:
  - Submit malware samples and get results back

## Outline

- BitBlaze in action: sample security applications
  - Automatic patch-based exploit generation
  - In-depth malware analysis and other applications
- BitBlaze Binary Analysis Infrastructure
  - Challenges
  - Design rationale
  - Architecture
- Future directions of binary analysis & beyond

#### BitBlaze Binary Analysis Infrastructure: Challenges

- Complexity
  - IA-32 manuals for x86 instruction set weights over 11 pounds
- Lack higher-level semantics
  - Even disassembling is non-trivial
- Require whole-system view
  - Operations within kernel and interactions btw processes
- Malicious code may obfuscate
  - Code packing
  - Code encryption
  - Code obfuscation & dynamically generated code

BitBlaze Binary Analysis Infrastructure: Design Rationale

- Accuracy
  - Enable precise analysis, formally modeling instruction semantics
- Extensibility
  - Develop core utilities to support different architecture and applications
- Fusion of static & dynamic analysis
  - Static analysis
    - » Pros: more complete results
    - » Cons: pointer aliasing, indirect jumps, code obfuscation, kernel & floating point instructions difficult to model
  - Dynamic analysis
    - » Pros: easier
    - » Cons: limited coverage
  - Solution: combining both

#### BitBlaze Binary Analysis Infrastructure: Architecture

- The first infrastructure:
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  - Capable of analyzing whole system (including OS kernel)
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![](_page_39_Figure_5.jpeg)

**BitBlaze Binary Analysis Platform** 

## Vine

![](_page_40_Figure_1.jpeg)

#### TEMU

- Work for both Windows & Linux, applications & kernel
- Build on QEMU

![](_page_41_Figure_3.jpeg)

## Rudder

- Compute path predicate
- Obtain new path predicate by reverting branches
- Solve path predicate to obtain new input to go down a different path

![](_page_42_Figure_4.jpeg)

Rudder

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  - Design rationale
  - Architecture
- BitBlaze in action: sample security applications
  - Automatic patch-based exploit generation
  - In-depth malware analysis
- Future directions of binary analysis & beyond

## The Vision

- Binary-only code audit and assurance
  - Given a third-party program
  - Does it have vulnerabilities?
  - Does it have certain security guarantees?
  - Does it contain trojans?

#### • Design and develop an infrastructure to accomplish this

- More advanced binary analysis and program verification techniques
- Annotated binaries
- Holistic solution including the software development cycle

## Conclusion

- BitBlaze binary analysis platform
  - A unique fusion of dynamic, static analysis & formal analysis
- Solutions to broad spectrum of security applications
  - Vulnerability discovery, diagnosis, defense
  - In-depth malware analysis
  - Automatic model extraction and analysis
- Important future research direction

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